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TITLE IX POLICY CHANGES FROM AN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PERSPECTIVE
AMY MOORE*
Good morning! To warn you, I’m not an expert in the substantive content of
all the Title IX pieces, but we are looking at administrative law here for a
better handle on how to treat all of the documents that come along with Title
IX, that interpret the pieces. A second note here is that I am only talking about
the sexual harassment guidance documents. There are a lot of pieces of Title
IX, and a lot of different types of documents, but I am only going to be
focusing on a few of them. As with all things, let’s start with the text of Title
IX, and work out those interpretive pieces.
The relevant statutory text is that first piece in Section 1681: “No person in
the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.”1 These
words were effectuated by the United States Department of Education
through the Office of Civil Rights. Where does that administrative law piece
come in? Right in § 1682; right after 1681 the statute says, “[e]ach federal
department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial
assistance to any education program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or
contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and
directed to effectuate the provisions of § 1681 of this title.”2 Immediately
after saying what the mandate was, Congress gave the power to the
department of education as part of this and its Office of Civil Rights to
interpret what it meant.

*
Amy Moore is a professor at Belmont University College of Law where she
teaches or has taught Administrative Law, Civil Procedure, Federal Courts, Immigration
Law, Public International Law, and Torts. She also serves as the Director of the Advocacy
program at Belmont University College of Law. Professor Moore received her B.A. from
Harding University, and received her J.D. from the University of Chicago Law School. Prior
to joining the Belmont University College of Law, Professor Moore worked as a litigation
associate practicing in securities fraud and credit card privacy at Kirkland & Ellis, LLP in
Chicago. She also taught Administrative Law, International Law, Education Law,
Immigration law, and Criminal Law at Faulkner University School of Law, and was an
active coach in the University’s moot court program.
1. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (1986).
2. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1682 (1972).
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Title IX was enacted in 1972, and there was a lot of activity that occurred
after.3 In fact, twenty years later in amending the Clery Act of 1990 Congress
passed the Higher Education Amendments in 1992, which required all
colleges and universities to “develop and distribute a statement of policy
regarding both campus sexual assault programs, which shall be aimed at
prevention of sex offenses, and procedures followed once a sex offense has
occurred.”4 After this, the Office of Civil Rights by 1994 had issued sort of
a regional resolution letter saying that this Title IX piece applied to university
campuses, so they also needed to develop these policies and procedures.
There were two landmark Supreme Court cases in this time period, Gebser
v. The City of Lago Vista in 1998, talking about teacher and student
harassment, and then Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education in 1999,
focused on student on student, or peer on peer harassment.5
The Davis Court provided the elements of a claim necessary under Title IX
that schools are liable when they are deliberately indifferent to sexual
harassment of which they have actual knowledge that is so severe, pervasive,
and objectively offensive, it can be said to deprive the victims of access to
the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.6
All of this activity led the Office of Civil Rights in 2001 to issue a Guidance
Document.7 The 2001 Guidance Document was issued in January of that
year; it’s about 48 pages long, and it did go through notice and comment and
was published in the Code of Federal Regulations as well.8
Some highlights from this 2001 Guidance; really, they wanted to put in place
and reaffirm what the court had done in Gebser and in Davis, and implement
all of these elements together. It talked about the purposes of Title IX, pulling
its procedural basis from Title IX, and saying that the Supreme Court,
Congress and agencies have recognized that sexual harassment qualifies
under Title IX, and that it constitutes discrimination. The guidance was to
tell schools what to do, “right here is how you fundamentally comply with

3. See, Lonnie D. Giamela, Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments, 3 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 439, 439-40 (2002).
4. Bonnie S. Fisher, Jennifer L. Hartman, Francis T. Cullen, and Michael G. Turner,
Making Campuses Safer for Students: The Clery Act as a Symbolic Legal Reform, 32
STETSON L. REV. 61, 69 (2002); 20 U.S.C.A. § 1092(e)(8)(A)(2013).
5. See, Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998); Davis v. Monroe
Cty. Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997), rev’d sub nom. Davis Next Friend
LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, (1999).
6. Davis, 526 U.S. at 629.
7. See, Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School
Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFF. OF CIVIL RIGHTS,
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf (2001).
8. Id.
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these requirements under Title IX, here is how you do it.” It describes the
regulatory basis for the compliance, outlines the circumstances under which
sexual harassment may constitute discrimination, and provides information
about actions that schools should take to both prevent sexual harassment or
address it effectively once it does occur. This was the standard for a lot of
years. This guidance document went through the proper procedures; the fact
that it went through notice and comment will be relevant later.
In 2011 there was a Dear Colleague letter issued under the Obama
administration.9 And this 2011 Dear Colleague letter released in April of that
year is only nineteen pages long, and it says that its purpose is to supplement
the 2001 guidance document. This letter supplements the 2001 guidance by
providing additional guidance and practical examples regarding Title IX
requirements as they relate to sexual violence. It gave more information to
what was necessary both under the 2001 guidance, and under the Title IX
statutory language itself. Now it says that,” if the school knows or reasonably
should know about student on student harassment that creates a hostile
environment, Title IX requires the school to take immediate action to
eliminate the harassment, prevent its recurrence, and address its effects.”10.
Schools are also required to publish a notice of nondiscrimination and to
adopt and publish grievance procedures, which they had previously11
There was some interesting information in in this 2011 letter where schools
were now required to investigate even if things took place off campus if they
had an impact that was happening on campus. The document had a lot of
“musts” and a lot of “should,” and then a lot of “well the office of civil rights
recommends that you do the following,” or “suggests that you do the
following.” But there was not a lot of guidance details about whether the
“recommends” were also mandates. So, what was the status of this 2011
letter? What was the school supposed to do in response to this letter? Did
they have to do what the letter said, or should they just like think about doing
what the letter said?
There were so many questions about the 2011 Dear Colleague letter that in
2014 the Office of Civil Rights released a Question and Answer document.
The Question and Answer document was significantly longer; it was about
fifty pages long. Much longer than the nineteen-page original Dear Colleague
letter; it was just a series of questions they had received, and answers to those
questions to supplement the 2001 guidance, and to supplement the Dear
Colleague letter itself. For the purposes of this presentation, I am going to

9. Dear Colleague, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. OFF. OF CIVIL RIGHTS, https://www2.ed.gov/
about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf (2011).
10. Id. at 4.
11. Id.
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collapse the 2011 Dear Colleague letter and the 2014 Question and Answer
document together.
Then in 2017, a change in power brought a new Dear Colleague letter. In
2017, also classified as a Dear Colleague letter, we had the Trump
administration negating both the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter and the
Question and Answer document from 2014.12 That is only a three page
document, released in September of 2017, which says, “these documents
interpreted Title IX,” talking about the 2011 and 2014 documents, “to impose
new mandates related to the procedures, by which educational institutions
investigate, adjudicate and resolve allegations of student on student sexual
harassment.”13
There were some listed complaints in this document about the previous ones:
that they led to rights deprivations on both sides; that they created a due
process problem; they have not provided the clarity necessary for educational
institutions; that there were some regulatory burdens or mandates imposed
without affording notice and the opportunity for comment.14 The Department
at the end of the letter stated that they wanted to develop an approach to
student sexual misconduct that responds to the concerns of stakeholders, and
aligns with the purposes of Title IX and provide access to educational
benefits.15 They intend to use notice and comment procedures to effectuate
this. As of now, there is no proposed rule but there is definitely some
groundwork laid in this letter for a notice and comment rule to be provided.
I go through this chronology to give us these relevant documents at the
beginning. We have got the statutory text, obviously; the 2001 guidance; the
2011 Dear Colleague Letter; the 2014 Question and Answer Document; and
the 2017 Dear Colleague Letter. Aren’t you glad I only decided to talk about
a few of the documents and not all of the different guidance documents that
came out at this time?
Just looking at this small subset of pieces, before we have the 2017 letter that
takes these pieces away, what was the status of the 2011 Dear Colleague
Letter and the 2014 Q&A? How could they be overturned? If you wanted to
say something about them, that they were problematic, where could you go?
Before 2017, how could courts regulate the use of the Dear Colleague letter
for enforcement purposes? Enter the Administrative Procedures Act.

12. Dear Colleague, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. OFF. OF CIVIL RIGHTS, https://www2.ed.gov/
about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-title-ix-201709.pdf (2017).
13. Id. at 3.
14. Id. at 2-3.
15. Id. at 3.
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Here is Section 706. Section 706 of the Administrative Procedures Act gives
us the plank by which courts could set aside agency action.16 Courts are
supposed to decide the relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability in terms of
an agency action.17 They can compel agency action that is unlawfully
withheld.18 They can also hold unlawful or set aside agency action if they are
one of the following. There are six different boxes or categories by which a
court can set aside agency action: (a) if it is arbitrary and capricious or
otherwise not in accordance with law; (b) if it’s contrary to some sort of
constitutional right; (c) if it’s in excess of statutory jurisdiction, or short of
statutory right, or some sort of statutory interpretation problem with what the
agency is actually doing; (d) if it’s made without observance of procedure
required by law; (e) if it is unsupported by substantial evidence in some cases
and (f) unwarranted by the facts.19 Sections (e) and (f) are more narrow than
the other concepts and only applied in certain circumstances. This was the
rubric available before 2017, if a court wanted to set aside the Dear Colleague
letter, how would that have worked?
The way to answer this, as we begin to analyze these documents, is to classify
the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter as something. It needs to be something so we
know where it is on this list. What are the procedures required by law to make
the Dear Colleague Letter, to know whether the Dear Colleague Letter was
passed in violation of that procedure? So how should this Dear Colleague
Letter be classified?
My students who took administrative law will recognize this sentence;
agencies make rules and they adjudicate, and they can do either one formally
or informally. The APA gives them rules and rubrics about how to make
other rules and how to do adjudications. So, the Dear Colleague letter would
have to be classified as a rule.
Section 551 of the Administrative Procedures Act defines a rule as, “the
whole or part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability,
and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or
policy.”20 There is no question that this is what the 2011 Dear Colleague
Letter is trying to do. It is making a statement about general applicability;
this is how schools ought to implement Title IX, here are the examples we
think they should follow. It is not an adjudication of any one particular
school, but it is meant to apply to all the schools.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

5 U.S.C. § 706 (1966).
Id.
Id.
Id.
5 U.S.C.A. § 551(4) (2011).
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Now, if it is a rule and it fits under this definition, then it has to follow the
guidelines of Administrative Procedure Act § 553 or fit into one of the
exceptions under Section 553.21 If Congress had wanted to, if they wanted
the Department of Education to use formal rulemaking - and that is outlined
in Section 554 and Section 556 and Section 557 of the APA – it would have
needed to invoke this higher standard of procedure somehow. 22 It needs to
indicate in the statute that a hearing is required on the record. That would
essentially convert rulemaking into formal rulemaking. What does formal
rulemaking look like? It is basically a trial for rules, and it can take up to ten
years to figure out whether a rule is appropriate under that trial. Here there is
no indication that Congress requires this higher level of procedure.
So, if they authorize the Department to make rules, we have this baseline in
Section 553 that says how those rules should operate and how they should be
promulgated. That baseline is also called “notice and comment” rulemaking.
So, what does Section 553 require? It requires notice and comment
rulemaking; this informal procedure that uses notice and comment
procedures. It is sort of just like it sounds.
The notice has to be either constructive or actual; in other words, actual
notice obviously means you can inform all of the regulated parties and just
send the Dear Colleague Letter to these schools and say: “Now do the things
the Dear Colleague letter says,” or you can publish them in the Federal
Register. When you publish letters or statements like this in the Federal
Register, that serves as constructive notice as well. When you put your notice
out, you have to include a reference to the legal authority, how is it that you
are able to promulgate this rule, the terms and substance of the rule, or at
least a description when you are proposing this rule to all these interested
parties.
The comment period includes just an opportunity for interested parties to
submit or participate in the rulemaking; they submit materials, they might be
oral, they might be written, and agencies will develop sort of their own
internal rules on the notice and comment system. They do not have to allow
for oral presentation.
Once the final rule is submitted, it must include a statement of basis and
purpose; we read the comments, we looked at the comments, and here is how
we have incorporated what you have said through the comment process into
the final rule. Remember, they have to follow these procedures, but they can
also have a rule be tossed out because it is arbitrary and capricious; if they
do not take into account a lot of the comments, or they do not look at all this
21. See, 5 U.S.C.A. § 553 (1966).
22. See, 5 U.S.C.A. § 554(1978); See, 5 U.S.C.A. § 556(1990); See, 5 U.S.C.A. § 557
(1976).
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information, they might be vulnerable on another plank. Agencies under this
subsection have to provide parties the ability to petition for the issuance of a
rule, to ask for a rule, to ask for the amendment to a rule, or the repeal.
Informal rules that are promulgated under Section 553 are often referred to
as legislative rules because they have the force of law.23
As such, if an agency uses notice and comment procedures, like they did in
the 2001 Guidance, the 2001 Guidance is law. It is a legislative rule, it has
the force of law, and we treat it as a law. Things that are promulgated under
the exceptions to Section 553, or the exemptions, do not have the force of
law. What are those exceptions? What are the exceptions to the notice and
comment requirements under Section 553?
Here is what the statute says: “Except when notice or hearing is required by
statute this subsection does not apply to interpret a rule, general statements
of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice, or when the
agency for good cause finds, and incorporates the finding in a brief statement
into the rules that notice and comment is impracticable, unnecessary or
contrary to the public interest.”24 Why do the exceptions to Section 553
matter here? If the Dear Colleague Letter does not fit under one of these
exceptions, then it is void for lack of procedure. If it is not an exception to
Section 553, then it was required to go through notice and comment, it did
not go through notice and comment, and so it is void on its face. It does not
matter what it says, the substantive issues do not matter, it is just void because
it is procedurally invalid. What also matters is that if it is an exception, if it
does fit under one of these exceptions, it does not have the force of law. That
is going to become relevant when we talk about what level of deference that
it ought to receive.
Four major exceptions that are bound up in this issue: 1) good cause – there
is some good reason not to use notice and comment, 2) it is an agency
procedure rule, 3) it is a policy statement, or 4) it is an interpretive
statement.25 I worked backwards here because an interpretive statement is the
only one that might work. Does this Dear Colleague Letter from 2011 meet
any of these requirements? Good cause does not apply here, not only because
the agency did not make a statement of good cause, they did not make a
finding that said, “it is too hard to do notice and comment,” they did not
invoke it, and they did not even make a claim that good cause was relevant.
What about procedure? The letter does not talk about agency procedure. In
other words, it is not about how the Office of Civil Rights works, it is not
about how the Department of Education works, it is clearly an impact to a
23. See, Am. Min. Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C.
Cir. 1993).
24. Supra note 19.
25. Id.
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substantive right of schools and students, and what actions are required. So,
that is pretty easily out as well. Is the Letter, which is labeled as guidance,
just a policy statement?
The test for policy statement used most often comes from the D.C. Circuit in
a case called American Hospital Association v. Bowen.26 A policy statement
has to have two requirements: (1) it may not have present effect, and (2) it
must leave the agency open to discretion. In other words, it cannot have
binding effect right now.27 The statement we looked at earlier, that 2011 Dear
Colleague Letter, with its “shoulds” and its “musts” and its examples,
definitely had binding effect. It was made to be immediately impacted to the
schools, so it cannot qualify as a policy statement. Thus, the only other
exception under Section 553 that it might meet, is an interpretative statement.
So how do we tell if the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter qualifies as an
interpretative statement? There is no clear Supreme Court rule on what an
interpretative statement looks like, but there is a collection of circuit courts
that have sort of cobbled together tests. I would not call it a split, but circuits
have had a nuanced approach about which things apply to interpretative rules
and which things do not.
The overwhelming test, for an interpretative statement is whether it has
independent legal effect; by itself, does it have a legal effect, or is it an
interpretation that hooks into something else, either hooking into a notice and
comment regulation or hooking into a statutory text? The D.C. Circuit’s
formulation of this test, in American Mining Congress v. MSHA in 1983 asks
questions like, “was it published in the Code of Federal Regulations?”28 If an
agency publishes something in the Code of Federal Regulations, they
probably want it to be a legislative rule. Did they specifically invoke
legislative authority? Were they trying to make something that had the force
of law or not? Is the interpretation a stand-alone basis for enforcement? Or is
the interpretation in conflict with a legislative rule that provides amendment
or revocation, or somehow impacts a legislative rule too much, and we need
more notice and comment for the interpretation?
The Seventh Circuit in 1992 uses a similar test, asking if the interpretation
creates a new duty that did not exist previously, and asks what type of power
the agency thinks that it is exercising.29 It has been argued in the literature
that the Dear Colleague Letter was imposing new duties on schools that were
not present in other procedurally valid rules; like the duty to investigate off
campus, how schools should handle police investigation, the standard of
26.
27.
28.
29.
(1992).

See, Am. Hosp. Asso. v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037 (1987).
Id. at 1046.
Am. Mining Cong., 995 F.2d at 1109.
Metro. Sch. Dist. of Wayne Twp., Marion Cty., Ind. v. Davila, 969 F.2d 485, 490
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proof, et cetera. There are a lot of examples inside of that. If we can make
the case, under either of these things, that the Dear Colleague Letter qualifies
as an interpretative statement, meaning it is not on its face procedurally
invalid, what do we do with it? If the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter is an
interpretative statement, what is it meant to be interpreting? The language
that it gives is that it supplements the 2001 guidance by providing additional
guidance and giving examples. There is not any detail where the document
itself says, “I am only interpreting this,” or “I am only interpreting that.” So,
this language and the language throughout the document leads to two
options; either the letter is interpreting the 2001 guidance, which was notice
and comment-created legislative guidance, or it is interpreting Title IX
directly.
Why does this distinction matter? Why do we need to hook it into one or the
other? Well the courts use different levels of deference depending on what
an agency interpretation hooks into, and it might be different in each instance.
Here are a couple of examples – this is the one about the preponderance of
the evidence standard, which I think Professor Penrose is going to talk more
about later. This is the information from the Dear Colleague Letter where
they talk about why we are picking preponderance of the evidence. We
looked at Title IX legislation, we looked at what OCR does in other civil
rights litigation contexts, we have interpreted it, and we think this is the right
standard. There is no language about the preponderance of evidence standard
in the 2001 guidance, and there is no discussion about it in any other notice
and comment regulation.
So, is this an interpretation, or is it something new? Is it a brand new mandate
that needed to go through notice and comment on its own? What has to be
argued and articulated here is whether the preponderance of evidence
standard is an interpretation of the 2001 guidance, or whether the
preponderance of evidence standard is really an interpretation of the statute.
Here is another smaller example. Title IX says that discrimination cannot
occur under a school’s education, programs, or activities, and says that
includes operations. The 2001 guidance says education programs and
activities, that statutory language, means all of the academic, educational,
extracurricular, athletic, and other programs of the school, whether they take
place in the facilities of the school, on a school bus, at a class or training
program sponsored by the school at another location, or elsewhere, and
elsewhere is ambiguous. In 2011, they said, “You have an obligation schools,
to investigate things that occur off campus,” and the example or hypothetical
they give is that something might occur off campus, someone comes back to
campus, and is harassed because of that assault that took place off campus.
If a student files a complaint, no matter where the harassment occurred, the
school must process the complaint now in accordance with its established
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procedures. The 2014 follows it up with a question, “Is a school required to
process complaints off campus?” Yes, and it gives an explanation to that.
Again, you have to argue and articulate, “what sort of interpretation is this?”
Is this 2011 Letter an interpretation of “elsewhere” or is it an interpretation
of what it means to be the operations of an educational institution? That
distinction makes a big difference. This example is complicated by the fact
that there was an intervening 2004 adjudication against a school in which
they told them there is no duty to investigate off campus, and yet in 2011
published a document that said there is. Now we have a conflict problem as
well that plays into the administrative law piece.
What if they are just interpreting? What if the Dear Colleague Letter is
interpreting the 2001 guidance? What do we do with it? When an agency is
interpreting their own regulations – which is what that would be an example
of – that interpretation must be given controlling weight unless it is plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.30 That’s in 1945. In 1997 in
Auer v. Robbins, the Court confirms this as the appropriate test when an
agency is investigating or interpreting its own regulations.31 Agencies get the
highest level of deference when interpreting their own regulations. Of course,
the Court is now reconsidering if Auer should even exist, they are waiting for
the appropriate case to see whether Auer should be continued, but right now
it is the law of the land.
If it is true that the 2011 document is interpreting that 2001 document, as
long as it is not inconsistent – and because it does not mention say
preponderance of evidence, and this one does, there is no inconsistence –
then they would say it is controlling weight. The agency interpreted it, they
get to; there are reasons for this type of deference – agencies are in the best
position to interpret their own regulations; they are the ones who have the
expertise to do it. The counterpoint is that sometimes agencies will use this
to try and game the system. They do not like the level of deference they get
for straight statutory interpretation, so they make a rule. It goes through
notice and comment. That rule is the statutory language, and then they use
interpretative statements, which do not have to go through notice and
comment, and slide by interpretations that might not survive the notice and
comment process. There is a bit of a counterpoint to that, but if it is
interpreting the guidance, this is the level of deference that is appropriate.
What if it is interpreting Title IX directly? What if we say it is that language
in Title IX that is most relevant? Well that is where we get Chevron, which
is the classic case for reviewing agency statutory interpretation.32 It has two

30. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
31. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
32. Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984).

88

BELMONT CRIMINAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. I: 78

steps. The test is traditionally in two parts. One, is the text ambiguous? 33 If
there is no ambiguity, just do what Congress said. If it is ambiguous, then we
move to the second question, which is: is the interpretation reasonable?34 Is
this a reasonable interpretation of the statute? It will not surprise you that
agencies typically win under the second step, whether it is a reasonable or
permissible interpretation of the statute.
If they are interpreting Title IX directly, we might use this Chevron deference
piece, except we have to worry about whether the Dear Colleague Letter has
the force of law, because Chevron is not always the appropriate test for
agency actions that do not have the force of law. In a trilogy of cases from
2000-2002, the Supreme Court opened up this inquiry. In 2000 in
Christensen v. Harris County, they said things that have the force of law that
are statutory interpretations definitely get Chevron deference.35 Period. The
end. In 2001 in United States v. Mead Corporation, they talked about things
that do not have the force of law, and said sometimes that will get Chevron
deference and sometimes it will not.36 Life is hard, we are not going to give
you any factors. In 2002 in Barnhart v. Walton, they wised up and said,
“Okay, sometimes things that do not have the force of law get Chevron
deference, here are some fun factors you can weigh out, and ask whether your
thing meets it or not.”37 We got this lovely fact paragraph. Barnhart requires
the analysis of the “interstitial nature of the legal question,” in other words,
is the agency gap-filling, the expertise of the agency, the importance of the
question to the statute, the complexity of the administration, and the careful
consideration of the question by the agency.38 So here, because the Dear
Colleague Letter did not go through notice and comment, and does not have
the force of law, if it is a statutory interpretation it does not automatically
receive Chevron deference.
You have to jump through what Cass Sunstein calls “step zero” of Chevron,
and ask if Chevron applies to the document at all, before it can move forward
in its interpretation.39 Now, if Chevron is inappropriate, if it does not work,
if Seminole Rock is inappropriate and does not work, we have a back-up level
of deference, and that back-up deference is called Skidmore deference.40 The
standard encourages deference due to an agency’s expertise, and the Court
said the weight of such an agency judgment in a particular case will depend
upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all of
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 842-43.
Id. at 845.
Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 220 (2001).
Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002).
Id.
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006).
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
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those factors which give it a power to persuade, if lacking a power to
control.41 In other words, if all else fails, agencies are still experts at
interpreting things and a court will listen to them, and ask whether their
interpretation is a good idea, and they want to agree with it as a good
interpretation, or is it a bad idea, and they want to not give it deference or
any weight to control?
When we bring back our focus into these documents, what has happened
from the 2017 Dear Colleague Letter is that we have gotten rid of this
administrative law problem essentially, because we have overridden the 2011
document, and we have overridden the 2014 document. But, interestingly
enough, we have done it through another Dear Colleague Letter. So, what is
the status of the 2017 Dear Colleague Letter? Is it an interpretation? It does
not say that it is interpreting much, although it might say, “I am interpreting
Title IX because I am telling you these other documents are not in accordance
with Title IX.” Is the 2017 document an amendment to the 2001 guidance?
Is it an amendment to the 2011 interpretation? Some circuits say that if you
are amending something so heavily, that means that the thing that you do
needs to have notice and comment because you are amending or taking out
another interpretation. It is hard to get to what the classification of the 2017
document will be, unless litigation forces a classification by forcing a court
to determine how it is classified and what kind of deference it will receive.
What did we learn from this? There are relevant questions for navigating
agency action. There are things that we need to ask when agencies do things
about whether they are valid or relevant. So, what is the agency document
that we are analyzing? What is it classified as procedurally? Is it binding? Is
it mandatory? Do we have to do it, or should we just think about doing it?
What kind of deference, if any, does the agency document deserve? How will
a court treat this document?
There are different levels of deference. There is Auer or Seminole Rock, if an
agency is interpreting its own regulation; there is Chevron for an agency that
is interpreting its statutory mandate, which is subject to exceptions; we need
to consider step zero, and whether Chevron applies, and look at Barnhart. If
the agency action has the force of law, you can go right to Chevron. If it is
notice and comment, you can skip this mess and just jump right in. But if not,
then you have to use Barnhart v. Walton to determine if the document still
gets Chevron deference, and if all else fails use Skidmore and talk to the court
about whether the document has the power to persuade. Any questions?
Audience. I was just curious, what is the typical type of case where you
would see these issues come up?
41. Id.
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Amy Moore. This comes up when agencies try to use these documents as the
enforcement rubric against someone, so say that the Office of Civil Rights
finds that your school is in violation of Title IX. How do we know it is in
violation? Well this document says so. Then you can go to court and say,
“No, that document should not apply to me because it is procedurally invalid
and it is arbitrary and capricious.” So, you tell the Court how to deal with
those interpretations of what the agency has done. You see a lot of it with
regard to regulated parties.
Audience. I’m essentially asking you to give away the exam answer, but
what is your take on the effect of the 2017 Dear Colleague Letter?
Amy Moore. I think that the 2017 Dear Colleague Letter’s effect may be
null. It may be null and void in that it is not really doing anything or
interpreting anything, but its effect is that it takes away that other problem.
If you think that there was a problem with the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter,
that it was procedurally invalid, or that it should not be given deference, or
whatever, that goes away with the 2017 interpretation. And it is unlikely to
be litigated as easily, because you are not using it to enforce, you are using it
to not enforce so it makes it more difficult for an aggrieved party to litigate
the validity of the 2017 Dear Colleague Letter.
Audience. So, it essentially negates all three of them?
Amy Moore. Yes, and it lays the groundwork for a new sort of notice and
comment piece. I could see a way in if you have someone who wanted to use
the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter against say, a university or a school, and now
is prohibited from doing that. In that case, this adoption of the 2017 Dear
Colleague Letter has aggrieved that person in some way. There is still a way
in, and there are lots of independent pieces as well. You saw my two
examples, we might have split the difference on those two examples and said,
“Well this interpretation is of the 2001 guidance, but that interpretation is of
the statute. So, you can break out these multi-page, multi-interpretation
documents, and have different conclusions about different parts of the
document.
Audience. Now, the timing question. If you have some type of grievance that
happened before the 2017 letter came out, and now you are litigating it after
the 2017 letter, what is the effect of that?
Amy Moore. Well it is going to be really hard. Even if they were to take that
at the time of your issue the 2011 guidance was the permanent guidance,
there will not be that support in litigation. In other words, when agencies
come to the table and they are trying to enforce it, they put all of their power
behind it and say, “We the Department of Education, believe this and here is
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why.” Now, that is not going to happen, so even if you were able to convince
a court that, “Yeah, I know it does not apply anymore, but at the time of my
problem the 2011 guidance was still relevant,” without that support from the
agency to say, “Yes, that is the right interpretation, and we believe it and we
support it,” it is less likely to be effective to a court. They are more likely to
want to find ways to loophole around it, and not use it in those instances.
Audience. What about the interim 2017 Q&A that the OCR issued?
Amy Moore. There is a reference in the 2017 document, I think to a 2006
Q&A as well. Those pieces have to be sort of independently funneled through
the system. Does that Q&A interpret the 2001 guidance? The 2017 letter
says, “We are leaving the 2001 guidance alone. The 2001 guidance is being
reaffirmed.” They are returning us to a pre-Dear Colleague Letter scenario
and saying that everything in the 2001 guidance is fine, it is just those two
documents that they revoke specifically. So, you have to analyze those other
pieces and see whether or not they are procedurally valid, and what kind of
deference they would receive.
Audience. Right, the 2017 Q&A in footnote three says that universities do
not have an obligation . . .
Amy Moore. But it is not a notice and comment interpretation, so again you
have to say: Is it an interpretative statement? Does it properly fit under that
Section 553 exception? If it does, what is that language interpreting? Is it
appropriately interpreting it? What level of deference would the Court give
that interpretation? Thank you.

